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Non-Technical Summary
The political agency problem between voters and their elected representa-
tives is one of the fundamental problems in political economics. The core of
this problem can be described very simply: Political representatives are often
better informed than voters about the prospects of all kind of public projects
as well as the costs of providing public goods and services. Furthermore,
the ability of voters to monitor their representatives is limited, too. Hence,
if governments invest in wasteful projects, give favors to special interests or
engage in some sort of rent-seeking from public projects, it is difficult for
the voter to find out about this: limited information often makes it impos-
sible for the voter to distinguish such behavior from benevolent and honest
political activities under unfavorable circumstances. To put it shortly, the
ability of voters to assess the absolute quality of public policies is, in general,
rather limited. This paper focuses on the problem of policy innovations, i.e.
the choice between traditional and new political technologies. Of course, the
voter always wants optimal policies to be implemented, but often it is difficult
to find out whether a new policy with an unknown payoff or a traditional pol-
icy with a known outcome is the best choice. At the same time, governments
often prefer to run known policies because they are less demanding. Hence,
governments tend to avoid policy innovations while pretending that what
they do is the optimum the voter can get. The paper addresses the question
whether in decentralized political systems, voters can benefit from the com-
parison of policies and outcomes across jurisdictions. The basic idea is that
comparative performance evaluation (‘yardstick competition’) across jurisdic-
tions may discipline local governments such that optimal policies are chosen
more often than under centralized government. In a theoretical analysis it is
shown that under certain conditions, yardstick competition indeed promotes
policy innovation. The paper thus supports the view that decentralized sys-
tems of governments offer favorable conditions for policy innovation. The
model also has empirical implications that will be tested in future empirical
work on policy innovations in federal systems.
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Abstract
A simple model of yardstick competition between jurisdictions is presented.
Governments of jurisdictions face the alternative to choose between an old
and a new policy with stochastic payoffs. The new policy is superior to the
old policy in one state of the world, and inferior in the other. Governments
are either benevolent, serving the interest of the voter, or rent-seeking. An
equilibrium with yardstick competition is shown to exist where bad govern-
ments having a good government in their neighborhood choose the new policy
more often compared to an equilibrium without relative performance evalua-
tion. Overall, the probability of policy innovations is increased by yardstick
competition. The model has a testable empirical implication saying that pol-
icy innovations should show spatial correlation.
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1 Introduction
The political agency problem between voters and their elected representa-
tives is one of the fundamental problems in political economics. The core of
this problem is a severe informational asymmetry: Representatives are bet-
ter informed than voters about the prospects of all kind of public projects
as well as the costs of providing public goods and services. Furthermore, the
ability of voters to monitor their representatives is limited, too. Thus in-
vestments in wasteful projects, favors to special interests and rent-seeking by
politicians often cannot be distinguished from benevolent and honest political
activities under unfavorable circumstances. Repeated elections are the basic
means the electorate can use to sort the bad representatives from the good.
But given that it is difficult for voters to assess the performance of their
representatives and to distinguish between bad performance and bad luck,
elections alone clearly do not work well as a discipline device for politicians.
In decentralized political systems, however, voters may base their decision at
the ballot box on comparative rather than absolute performance (or both).
In correlated environments, inference on the quality of a jurisdiction’s per-
formance will be more precise if it is based on a performance comparison
across several jurisdictions. In their strategic interaction with the electorate,
representatives will anticipate the comparative performance evaluation and
adjust their behavior. In recent years, the resulting political yardstick com-
petition between jurisdictions and its effect on political accountability has
been a much discussed topic in the public economics literature.
In this paper, the question of policy innovation in the presence of yard-
stick competition is addressed. In a simple model with two jurisdictions,
governments face the alternative to choose between an old and a new pol-
icy with stochastic payoffs. The new policy is superior to the old policy in
one state of the world, and inferior in the other. Choosing the new policy is
costly for governments since they have to invest some additional effort to per-
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form it. Together with a policy, governments choose transfers to themselves,
thereby reducing the share of policy payoffs going to the electorate. There
are two types of governments, benevolent (‘good’) and rent-seeking (‘bad’).
The model has two time periods, with elections taking place at the end of
the first period.
The main results of the model are the following. Without yardstick compe-
tition, bad governments prefer the old policy in all cases. This is because the
new policy is costly to perform and bad governments cannot increase their
reelection probability by switching from the old to the new policy. With
yardstick competition, however, an equilibrium is shown to exist where the
overall probability of innovations conditional on the new policy being su-
perior is higher than without yardstick competition. In this equilibrium,
bad governments seeking reelection and expecting to see innovations by good
governments in their neighborhood choose the new policy. This is because
successfully innovating good governments reveal that the new policy is su-
perior. Bad governments seeking reelection therefore have to switch to the
innovation, too. These findings also carry over to an extended model with a
multi-dimensional policy space. In a situation where voters base their infer-
ence on the quality of policies at home on the performance of their govern-
ments relative to nearby rather than to more distant jurisdictions, the model
has a testable empirical implication saying that policy innovations should
show positive spatial correlation.
The paper is related to a number of papers in the growing body of literature
on political agency problems. In one of the fundamental contributions in the
field, Coate and Morris (1995) show how asymmetric information about poli-
cies (‘policy uncertainty’) and politicians (‘politician uncertainty’) in a world
with rational voters can explain that transfers to special interests are often
made inefficiently. Besley and Case (1995) introduced yardstick competition
between jurisdictions as a discipline device for rent-seeking politicians. They
show how the asymmetric information problem between politicians and vot-
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ers can in correlated environments be alleviated by comparative performance
evaluation across jurisdictions.1 This paper extends the model of Besley and
Case (1995) to allow for strategic interaction between jurisdictions with re-
spect to policy innovations as discrete choice decisions. The analysis is also
extended to a multi-dimensional policy space. Kotsogiannis and Schwager
(2003) discuss the effect of outside information on the incentives to experi-
ment with innovative public policies. They show that outside information is
a two-sided edge: it is beneficial since it helps the voter to separate selfish
from benevolent politicians, but it also creates an externality that reduces
the incentives to engage in policy experiments. This paper takes a different
approach and assumes that incumbents do not have to experiment in order to
find out about optimal policies. Instead, the paper discusses the role of out-
side information provided by observable policy decisions in other jurisdictions
in a situation where for incumbents choosing the optimal policy is sometimes
costly. In a recent contribution, Kotsogiannis and Schwager (2004) discuss
the effect of career concerns of politicians in federal systems on their willing-
ness to experiment with new policies. Recent contributions that deal with the
role of yardstick competition in political agency problems include Besley and
Smart (2002), who discuss the effect of yardstick competition on public good
provision and wasteful spending, Belleflamme and Hindriks (2002), extend-
ing the approach of Coate and Morris (1995) to a multi-agency framework,
and Wrede (2001), who provides a model with rent-seeking politicians and
yardstick competition in a more richly modelled political system.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents
the model. In section 3, Perfect Bayesian Equilibria for the model with a
single jurisdiction and with yardstick competition between two jurisdictions
are analyzed. An extension of the model with a multi-dimensional policy
space is discussed in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
1In the principal-agent theory more general incentive schemes involving yardstick compe-
tition have been analyzed. See, for example, Holmstrom (1982).
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2 The model
Consider two jurisdictions i = 1, 2. Each jurisdiction is populated by a
representative resident and has a government which performs a public policy
pi generating a payoff pii. Governments face the alternative to choose between
an old policy o and a new policy n. The payoff from the old policy is either
pi or pi + ∆, where ∆ > 0. There are two states of the world, s ∈ {1, 2}.
In state 1, the new policy either generates payoff pi + 3∆ or pi + 2∆ and is
therefore superior to the old policy. In state 2, the new policy has payoffs
pi − ∆ or pi − 2∆. Hence, in state 2 the new policy is inferior to the old
policy. Residents derive per-period utility vi = pii − τi, where τi is a transfer
the government can make to itself. Governments are either benevolent or
rent-seeking. Good governments behave non-strategically and always choose
the policy with the higher payoff together with a zero transfer in order to
maximize the representative resident’s utility. Bad governments’ per-period
utility is
ui(pi, τi) =

τi − e if pi = n
τi if pi = o ,
where e > 0 is a special effort needed to perform n.2 Let the transfer be
restricted to τ ∈ {0,∆, τ¯} and assume τ¯ > ∆ > e as well as τ¯ < 3∆.3 The
former assumption means that we allow for transfers exceeding the difference
between the high and the low payoff given a certain state of the world and a
certain policy, and that we require that choosing the new policy and taking
a transfer that equals this difference generates a positive per-period utility
for incumbents. The latter assumption guarantees that, given that the new
policy is used, the lowest possible per-period utility of the voter in state 1 is
2One could see e as the effort needed to perform the new policy in excess of the effort
needed to perform the old policy.
3The assumption that the choice of transfers is discrete is not restrictive. With τ ∈ [0, τ¯ ]
instead the crucial properties of the equilibria discussed in the following are the same.
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higher than the highest per-period utility in state 2.
The model has two time periods, where utility derived in the second period
is discounted with the discount factor δ, with δ ∈ (0, 1). At the beginning
of period 1, Nature draws a state of the world s, which is the same for both
jurisdictions, for each jurisdiction the type of an incumbent government Ii ∈
{G,B}, where G stands for ‘good’ and B for ‘bad’, and for each jurisdiction
a variable Si ∈ {L,H} indicating whether the policy payoffs, given a state
of the world, are low (Si = L) or high (Si = H). For example, suppose
state 1 has been realized and Si = H has been drawn for jurisdiction i. The
incumbent in i then has to choose between the new policy with payoff pi+3∆
and the old policy with payoff pi + ∆. If, in contrast, Si = L is drawn, the
choice is between pi + 2∆ from the new policy and pi from the old policy.
Let θ be the probability that state 2 is realized, and Pr(Ii = G) = γ
(i = 1, 2) the probability that a good incumbent is drawn in jurisdiction i.
The draws of I1 and I2 are independent. The variables S1 and S2, determining
the policy payoffs conditional on state s in both jurisdictions, are distributed
according to the joint density
S2
L H
L qσ q(1− σ)
S1
H q(1− σ) 1− q(2− σ)
where σ ≡ Pr[Si = L|Sj = L], i 6= j. Thus q is a jurisdiction’s (unconditional)
probability of having S = L. Since we do not want to deal with the case of
negative correlation between S1 and S2, let σ be restricted by σ ∈ [q, 1]. With
σ = 1 we have perfect correlation, whereas with σ = q we have independence.4
After s, Ii and Si (i = 1, 2) have been drawn, incumbents in both ju-
risdiction simultaneously choose a pair (pi, τi). Policy payoffs are realized,
4This density has been used in a model contained in the working paper version of Bor-
dignon, Cerniglia, and Revelli (2003).
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and the utility vi = pii − τi is delivered to the voters. At the end of period
1, elections take place. In each jurisdiction, the resident either reelects the
incumbent or chooses a challenger who is drawn from the same distribution
as incumbents. The voting is retrospective, and resident-voters care about
maximizing their period-2 utility. In period 2, governments (either reelected
incumbents or newly elected challengers) once again choose a policy and a
transfer to themselves.
Information is distributed as follows. All underlying distributions are com-
mon knowledge. The draws of s and Ii, i = 1, 2 are revealed to both juris-
diction’s incumbents. Thus each incumbent knows the state of the world,
its own type and the type of the other jurisdiction’s incumbent.5 Further-
more, each incumbent observes the realization of Si in his own jurisdiction.
Consequently, when simultaneously choosing (pi, τi), incumbents in i = 1, 2
have perfect information about the payoff pii their policy pi will generate in
their own jurisdiction. With regard to policy payoffs in the other jurisdic-
tion, incumbents know which policy is superior and the distribution of payoffs
conditional on the incumbent’s policy choice in the neighboring jurisdiction.
Residents in both jurisdictions do not know neither incumbents’ types nor
the realizations of s and Si, i = 1, 2. What the resident in i observes is the
policy in i and his utility vi, i.e. the payoff from pi net of the transfer taken by
the incumbent. If (and only if) we allow for yardstick competition, residents
can also observe the policy and the resident’s utility in the other jurisdiction.
5The assumption that incumbents know each other’s type is the one Besley and Case
(1995) use. That incumbents can condition their strategies on the type of incumbent in
the other jurisdiction is particularly important for the empirical implication of yardstick
competition to generate spatial correlation in policy innovations.
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3 Analysis of equilibria
Two equilibria will be derived, one without comparative performance evalu-
ation (voters cannot observe the policy choice and the resident’s utility level
in the other jurisdiction) and one with yardstick competition, where voters
base their voting rule on the observation of incumbents’ performance in both
jurisdictions.
3.1 An equilibrium without yardstick competition
Without yardstick competition, there is no link between both jurisdictions.
The Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium described in proposition 1 is thus an equi-
librium in the behavior of incumbents and resident-voters if we look at each
of both jurisdictions separately. Denote the strategies of incumbents6 by
µ[s, Si, Ii] = (pi, τi) and the strategies of residents as voters by ς(pi, vi) ∈ [0, 1].
With respect to out-of-equilibrium beliefs of voters the following simple rule
is specified: Whenever it is apparent that a transfer has been taken and/or
it is apparent that the inferior policy has been chosen in i, the voter in i
believes that Ii = B.
7 For notational convenience, define the sets Ci =
{(n, pi + 3∆), (n, pi + 2∆), (o, pi + ∆), (o, pi)} and Di = Ci\{(o, pi)}, i = 1, 2.
Ci is the set of all pairs (pi, vi) which, for some draw of s and Si, contain as
elements the superior policy and the corresponding utility of the voter given
a zero transfer. Note that the index for jurisdictions is suppressed in the
remainder of this subsection.
Although good incumbents behave non-strategically, for completeness the
description of their behavior is included in the following proposition.
6Strictly speaking this labelling is not correct, since second period choices of governments
are not described. These are trivial, however, and the paper follows the literature in sup-
pressing them from what is called incumbents’ strategies.
7Under proposition 1, pairs (p, v) which do not occur on the equilibrium path will neces-
sarily reveal that either a transfer has been taken or the inferior policy has been chosen, or
both.
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Proposition 1 Define θ∗ ≡ (1 − q)/q, δ∗ = 1 −∆/τ¯ and suppose q ≥ 1/2,
θ ≥ θ∗ and δ ≥ δ∗. Then there exists a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium with
the following strategies:
Good incumbents set
(i) µ(1, H,G) = µ(1, L,G) = (n, 0),
(ii) µ(2, H,G) = µ(2, L,G) = (o, 0),
bad incumbents set
(iii) µ(1, H,B) = µ(2, H,B) = (o,∆),
(iv) µ(1, L,B) = µ(2, L,B) = (o, τ¯),
and the representative voter sets
(v) ς[(p, v) ∈ C] = 1,
(vi) ς[(p, v) /∈ C] = 0.
Proof. We begin by checking for profitable deviations of the voter. Since
good incumbents maximize the voter’s utility and bad incumbents according
to the proposed strategy never play in a way such that (p, v) ∈ D, reelecting
the incumbent after observing (p, v) ∈ D and not reelecting after observing
(p, v) /∈ C is optimal for the voter. Let Pr(I = G|p, v) denote the voter’s
beliefs. After observing (o, pi), the probability of having a good government
in office is Pr(I = G|o, pi) = γθqγθq+(1−γ)(1−q) . This is at least as high as γ, the
probability of drawing a good challenger, if θ ≥ θ∗. Since q ≥ 1/2, it is
guaranteed that θ∗ ≤ 1.
Now we have to check for profitable deviations of bad incumbents. For
a bad incumbent having S = L playing (o, τ¯) dominates any other action:
Reelection can only be gained by taking a zero transfer in the first period,
which cannot be optimal given that the utility from taking the maximum
transfer in the second period is δτ¯ . Since choosing the new policy is costly, it
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can also not be optimal to play p = n and take some transfer τ ∈ {0,∆, τ¯}.
If S = H, a bad government receives utility ∆+δτ¯ by following the proposed
strategy. As before, playing p = n instead cannot be optimal since e > 0.
Finally, given that δ ≥ δ∗, a deviation to (o, τ¯) is not profitable.
The intuition for this equilibrium is simple. Bad governments want to
extract the highest possible transfer in the first period, but at the same time
they seek reelection. With a sufficiently high discount factor, a mimicking
behavior in the case of S = H becomes worthwhile: The cost of a reduced
transfer in the first period is outweighed by the benefit of winning reelection
and being able to extract the maximum transfer in the second period. Since
using the new policy is costly in terms of additional effort, in their mimicking
behavior bad governments prefer the old policy even if the new one generates
higher payoffs. For the voter, reelecting governments pretending that the old
policy is superior and that payoffs are low is optimal as long as the probabil-
ities that state 2 has been realized and that payoffs are low are sufficiently
high.
3.2 An equilibrium with yardstick competition
For the case with yardstick competition, denote strategies of the incum-
bent in i by µ(s, Si, Ii; Ij) = (pi, τi) and the strategies of the voter in i
by ς(pi, vi; pj, vj) ∈ [0, 1], i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j. Since good incumbents be-
have as before, the description of their behavior is suppressed in the fol-
lowing proposition. Assume that out-of-equilibrium beliefs of voters are
formed according to the following rules: (i) Whenever, for some jurisdic-
tion i, it is apparent that a transfer has been taken and/or it is apparent
that the inferior policy has been chosen, voters in both jurisdictions be-
lieve that Ii = B. (ii) If voters observe a combination (p1, v1), (p2, v2) which
does not occur on the equilibrium path, while complying to (i) they use
Bayes’ Rule whenever possible to form their beliefs with respect to the types
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of incumbents holding office.8 For notational convenience, define the sets
Ei = {(pi, vi) : pi = n, vi ∈ {pi+3∆, pi+2∆, pi+3∆− τ¯ , pi+∆, pi+2∆− τ¯}},
i = 1, 2. The crucial property of Ei is that after observing some (pi, vi) ∈ Ei,
voters in both jurisdictions know that the new policy is superior.
Proposition 2 Define δ∗∗ = 1− ∆−eτ¯ , σ∗∗ = 3q−12q and γ∗∗ = 1−q(2−σ+θ(1−σ))1−q(2−σ+θ(2−3σ)),
and suppose q > 1/2, θ ≥ θ∗, σ ≤ σ∗∗, γ ≥ γ∗∗ and δ ≥ δ∗∗. Then there
exists a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium with the following strategies:
Bad incumbents set
(i) µ(1, H,B;B) = (o,∆),
(ii) µ(1, H,B;G) = (n,∆),
(iii) µ(1, L,B;B) = µ(1, L,B;G) = µ(2, L,B;B) = µ(2, L,B;G) = (o, τ¯),
(iv) µ(2, H,B;B) = µ(2, H,B;G) = (o,∆),
and the representative voters sets
(v) ς[(pi, vi) ∈ {(n, pi + 3∆), (n, pi + 2∆)}; ·] = 1,
(vi) ς[(pi, vi) ∈ {(o, pi +∆), (o, pi)}; (pj, vj) ∈ Ej] = 0,
(vii) ς[(pi, vi) ∈ {(o, pi +∆), (o, pi)}; (pj, vj) /∈ Ej] = 1,
(viii) ς[(pi, vi) /∈ Ci; ·] = 0.
Proof. Once again we begin by checking for profitable deviations of the voter.
Let Pr(Ii = G|pi, vi; pj, vj) denote beliefs of voters. As before, if the voter
observes (n, pi+3∆) in his own jurisdiction, he believes a good incumbent to
be in office with probability one. For (pi, vi) = (n, pi+2∆), we have to consider
three cases. Firstly, Pr(Ii = G|n, pi + 2∆;n, pi + 3∆) = γq(1−σ)γq(1−σ)+(1−γ)(1−q(2−σ)) .
This is at least as high as γ since σ ≤ σ∗∗. Furthermore, σ∗∗ ≥ q ∀ q ∈ [12 , 1],
8As we will see, for all possible combinations (p1, v1), (p2, v2) off the equilibrium path under
proposition 2, beliefs with respect to the type of the incumbent in at least one jurisdiction
are given by (i).
10
such that for all such q there exists some σ ∈ [12 , 1] for which q ≤ σ ≤ σ∗∗
holds. Secondly, Pr(Ii = G|n, pi + 2∆;n, pi + 2∆) = γσ+(1−γ)(1−σ)γσ+2(1−γ)(1−σ) , which is
at least as high as γ given that σ ≥ 1/2. Thirdly, after observing (n, pi +
2∆; (pj, vj) /∈ {(n, pi+3∆), (n, pi+2∆)}), reelecting the incumbent is optimal
since by applying Bayes’ Rule and – if necessary – the out-of-equilibrium
beliefs, in all cases we find that the probability of having a good incumbent
in office is one.
Part (vi) of the voter’s strategy reflects out-of-equilibrium beliefs. Since
the observation of each of the elements in Ej reveals that the new policy is
superior, it is optimal not to reelect a government in i 6= j choosing pi = o.
With regard to part (vii) of the voters strategy, first note that bad gov-
ernments according to the proposed strategies never play (o, pi + ∆). As
long as (pj, vj) /∈ Ej, it is therefore optimal to reelect the incumbent in
i 6= j after observing (pi, vi) = (o, pi + ∆). Furthermore, note that Pr(Ii =
G|o, pi; o, pi + ∆) = Pr(Ii = G|n, pi + 2∆;n, pi + 3∆). Thus it is optimal to
reelect the incumbent in i after observing (o, pi; o, pi+∆) given that σ ≤ σ∗∗.
If voters observe (o, pi) in both jurisdictions, the probability of having a good
government is γ
2θqσ+γ(1−γ)θq(1−σ)
γ2θqσ+2γ(1−γ)θq(1−σ)+(1−γ)2(1−q(2−σ)) . This is at least as high as
γ given that γ ≥ γ∗∗. Note that the denominator in γ∗∗ is positive for all
θ ∈ [θ∗, 1] given that q ∈ (12 , 1] and σ ∈ [q, σ∗∗], and that γ∗∗ ≤ 1 ∀ σ ≥ 1/2.
If (o, pi; o, pi − τ¯) is observed, the probability for the voter in i of having a
good government in office is γθσγθσ+(1−γ)(1−σ) . This is at least as high as γ for
all θ ∈ [θ∗, 1] given that σ ≥ q. Finally, applying Bayes’ Rule together with
the out-of-equilibrium beliefs specified above shows that for all remaining
(pj, vj) /∈ Ej it is optimal to reelect the incumbent after observing (o, pi) in i.
Part (viii) of the voters strategy is optimal since by observing (pi, vi) /∈ Ci
it is revealed that either a transfer has been taken or the inferior policy has
been chosen in i, or both.
Now we check for profitable deviations of bad incumbents. It is easy to
see that, if both governments are bad, policy choices and transfers identical
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to those described in proposition 1 together with the specified beliefs and the
proposed voting rule constitute an equilibrium in the presence of yardstick
competition. If the other government is good, however, it is not longer op-
timal for a bad incumbent in i to choose (o,∆) if s = 1 and Si = H since
the superior new policy will be used in j, leading the voter in i to vote for
the challenger. Instead, it is now optimal for i’s incumbent to set (n,∆),
to deliver vi = pi + 2∆ to the voter and gain reelection: Since δ ≥ δ∗∗, the
utility ∆ − e + δτ¯ is at least as high as the one from the best alternative,
(o, τ¯). If s = 2 and Si = H, (o,∆) remains the optimal choice since given the
proposed voting rule the probability of reelection is one. If Si = L and the
other government is good, the same reasoning as in the proof of proposition
1 applies.
The intuition for the yardstick equilibrium is straightforward. By now
being able to compare policies in two jurisdictions, voters have additional
information to base their reelection decision on. In state 1, a bad incumbent
knowing that the government in the other jurisdiction is good is now forced
to choose the new policy to gain reelection. Since the performance of the
good government will reveal that the new policy is superior, using the old
policy would result in the government being removed from office. The voter
thus benefits from the additional information available by getting the superior
policy more often. The selection properties, i.e. the probabilities of finding
out a bad incumbent, are the same in both equilibria.
The condition on the discount factor δ is of course stronger for the yard-
stick equilibrium than for the equilibrium without comparative performance
evaluation. The reason is that, if the other government is good and the new
policy must be used for a successful mimicking, the additional effort e has
to be invested to perform the public policy. Note, however, that the role
of e is only to make the new policy, other things being equal, less attrac-
tive for bad governments than the old policy. Thus e might be arbitrarily
small, and lime→0 δ∗∗ = δ∗. If the new policy is superior, payoffs are high and
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the other government is bad, or if the old policy is superior and payoffs are
high, bad governments imitate good governments in equilibrium by choosing
(o,∆) and delivering v = pi. Consequently, a sufficiently high γ is necessary
to make reelection the optimal choice for the voter after observing (o, pi) in
both jurisdictions.
The most interesting parameter is σ. The yardstick equilibrium is sup-
ported by values of σ ∈ [q, σ∗∗], i.e. the positive correlation between S1 and
S2 must be sufficiently low. The intuition is that it must be worthwhile for
the voter in i to reelect an incumbent using the same policy as the neighbor-
ing jurisdiction’s incumbent but delivering a utility equal to the low payoff
compared to a utility equal to the high payoff delivered to the voter in j. As
a counterexample, consider the case with perfect correlation [σ = 1] between
S1 and S2 for some q ∈
(1
2 , 1
)
. In this situation, it cannot be optimal for
the voter in i to reelect an incumbent choosing pi = n and delivering, say,
vi = pi + 2∆ given that vj = pi + 3∆ since it is apparent that a transfer has
been taken in i.
In general, benevolent governments in other jurisdictions introduce a par-
ticularly rigorous yardstick for government performance limiting the level of
rents that can be extracted by office-motivated governments seeking a second
term of office. Consider a situation in which, as in the model above, the rents
governments can earn are the same in both periods. Suppose furthermore
that the level of rents which can be earned in the first period without for-
going reelection, given that the government in the other jurisdiction is good,
is reduced to zero.9 Rent-seeking governments will then take the maximum
rent they can get in the first period and forgo reelection. Under these circum-
stances, yardstick competition forces bad governments to behave, from the
point of view of voters, worse with respect to first-period performance than
9An example would be the model with σ = 1.
13
in a situation without comparative performance evaluation.10 The model
from section 2 illustrates an effect of yardstick competition which is more
in line with the original Brennan and Buchanan (1977) view: Forcing bad
governments to use more caution when they engage in rent seeking. In the
equilibrium described above, bad governments manage to extract rents with-
out forgoing reelection even in cases where the yardstick is set by a good
government. But in some cases they now have to choose the superior new
policy in order to gain reelection. Yardstick competition in this model thus
serves as a discipline device for rent-seeking governments. In our example,
the benefit to voters comes as a higher probability of having a government
choosing optimal policies.
The yardstick competition equilibrium has an interesting empirical im-
plication. It seems plausible that in any given jurisdiction, voters are bet-
ter informed about governments’ performance in nearby jurisdictions than
in more distant jurisdictions. Hence, we should expect yardstick competi-
tion between jurisdictions to make local decisions in the adoption of policy
innovations depending on expected policies is neighboring jurisdictions. Em-
pirically, this would mean positive spatial correlation in policy innovations
across jurisdictions. The simplest way to test this prediction would be to
define innovative versus traditional policies in a particular policy field and
to check whether the distribution of policy innovations across jurisdictions
shows positive spatial correlation or not. In practice, however, things may
not be that easy, because most local governments are active in various policy
fields and fulfill lots of different tasks. Hence, governments may choose a mix
between innovative policies for some tasks and more traditional approaches
for others. Furthermore, the importance of various fields in public policy may
vary across jurisdictions. For instance, some tasks may be common to all ju-
risdictions, while others may be specific for governments in certain regions.
10In such a model, voters gain from yardstick competition by an increased probability of
finding out bad governments.
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This, of course, will feed back to jurisdictions and their choice of policies.
Hence, a more general model will be useful in order to come up with testable
hypotheses on the strategic behavior of jurisdictions in the adoption of policy
innovations.
4 Yardstick competition with common and
jurisdiction-specific policies
In the following, a straightforward extension of the theoretical analysis will be
presented. It covers asymmetric jurisdictions and a multi-dimensional policy
space. The empirical implications derived from this theory will also be briefly
discussed.
Consider the model from section 2 with the extension that we now have two
tasks k = A,B. Suppose that A is a common task which has to be fulfilled
in both jurisdictions and let B be a task which is specific for jurisdiction
2 and which is not a policy task in jurisdiction 1. Clearly, with regard to
the specific task, yardstick competition between jurisdictions is impossible.
However, yardstick competition may takes place with respect to the common
task.
The government in i = 1 has to make the same choice as before. In i = 2
the government now has to choose two policies p2A and p2B. For each task,
the choice is between an old and a new policy. Assume that task-specific
state variables sk ∈ {1, 2}, k = A,B are independently drawn from the same
distribution. θ is now the probability that sk = 2 is drawn for task k = A,B.
If sk = 1 [sk = 2], the new [old] policy is superior for task k. As in the
model with a one-dimensional policy space, policy payoffs are either low or
high depending on the draw for Si ∈ {L,H}. Together with the policies p2A
and p2B, task-specific transfers τ2A, τ2B ∈ {0,∆, τ¯} must be chosen. The
per-period utility of the government in i = 2 from performance in task k now
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is
u2k(p2k, τ2k) =

τ2k − e if p2k = n
τ2k if p2k = o .
In the situation without yardstick competition little is changed compared
to subsection 3.1. In i = 1, proposition 1 holds. For i = 2, it is easy to show
that an equilibrium exists where
(i) bad governments choose (o,∆) for both tasks if S1 = H;
(ii) bad governments choose (o, τ¯) for both tasks if S1 = L;
(iii) the voter opts for the challenger if it is apparent that a transfer has been
taken or it is apparent that the inferior policy has been chosen for some task
k = A,B, or both, and reelects the incumbent otherwise.
For the situation with yardstick competition, let the strategies of incum-
bents in i = 1 be denoted by µ(sA, Si, Ii) = (p1A, τ1A), while strategies
of incumbents in i = 2 are denoted as µ(sA, sB, Si, Ii) = (µA, µB), where
µk = (p2k, τ2k), k = A,B. Assume out-of-equilibrium beliefs defined by anal-
ogy to the model with yardstick competition in a single common policy.
Proposition 3 Define σ˜ = 1/(1 + θ2), γ˜ = 1−q(2−σ+θ
2(1−σ))
1−q[2−σ+θ2(1−σ)+θ(1−σ(1+θ))], θ˜ =
[1− q(2− σ)]/[q(1− σ)] and ˜˜θ = [(1− q)/(3q − 1)] 12 and suppose
(a) q ≥ 1/2,
(b) θ ≥ max{θ˜, ˜˜θ},
(c) σ˜ ≤ σ ≤ σ∗∗,
(d) δ ≥ δ∗∗,
(e) γ ≥ γ˜ if 1− q[2− σ + θ2(1− σ) + θ(1− σ(1 + θ))] > 0.
Then there exists a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium with the following strate-
gies:
Bad incumbents and voters in i = 1 follow their strategies described in propo-
sition 2.
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Bad incumbents in i = 2 set
(i) µk(1, H,B;B) = (o,∆), k = A,B
(ii) µA(1, H,B;G) = (n,∆),
µB(1, H,B;G) = (o,∆),
(iii) µk(2, H,B;B) = µk(2, H,B;G) = (o,∆), k = A,B
(iv) µk(1, L,B;B) = µk(1, L,B;G) =
µk(2, L,B;B) = µk(2, L,B;G) = (o, τ¯), k = A,B.
Voters in i = 2 vote for the challenger whenever for some task k = A,B it is
apparent that a transfer has been taken or if it is apparent that the inferior
policy has been chosen in i, or both. In all other cases, the incumbent is
reelected.
Proof. See the appendix.
From proposition 3 we see that the role of yardstick competition as a
discipline device for rent-seeking politicians carries over from the simple to
a richer model with various political tasks of governments and varying de-
grees of yardstick competition across tasks. However, in a model with only
a subset of tasks being subject to yardstick competition the pattern of gov-
ernment performance becomes richer. Even benevolent governments now
switch from innovative to conservative policies across tasks. Moreover, rent-
seeking governments can stick to conservative policies and avoid innovations
for jurisdiction-specific tasks where comparative performance evaluation by
voters is hampered. This gives rent-seeking governments additional possi-
bilities to masquerade as acting in the interest of the voter. Of course, for
common tasks the same discipline-enhancing effect of comparative perfor-
mance evaluations by voters is at work: if a new policy is shown to be supe-
rior by successfully innovating good governments in the neighborhood, bad
governments seeking reelection are forced to use the innovation, too.
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The empirical implications of the extended model are the following: Firstly,
the share of tasks where innovative policies are used should on average be
higher with yardstick competition than without. Hence, governments should
implement innovative policies more often if policy competition is stronger.
Secondly, the share of tasks where governments use innovative policies should
show spatial correlation. Finally, the model suggests that the degree of spa-
tial correlation in policy innovations varies across lpolicies with the intensity
of policy competition.
5 Conclusion
This paper offers a simple theoretical framework for the analysis of strategic
interaction between jurisdictions with respect to policy innovations. Fur-
thermore, the paper provides testable hypotheses on spatial patterns in the
adoption of policy innovations by jurisdictions in a situation where informa-
tion on the prospects of new vs. old policies is asymmetrically distributed
between rent-seeking governments and voters.
For the simple model with yardstick competition between jurisdictions, the
existence of a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium has been shown. In this equi-
librium, rent-seeking governments are disciplined by voters who are able to
compare the performance of politicians across jurisdictions. With yardstick
competition, the optimal policy is chosen more often compared to the equi-
librium without yardstick competition, while the level of rents extracted by
incumbents as well as the selection properties are the same in both equilibria.
Hence, the voters in this model are better off with yardstick competition than
without.
The basic model has also been extended to cover a situation where govern-
ments have to fulfill multiple political tasks with varying degrees of yardstick
competition across tasks. We have seen that the role of yardstick competi-
tion as a discipline device for rent-seeking politicians carries over from the
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basic to the more involved model with only a subset of tasks being subject
to yardstick competition. However, the pattern of government performance
becomes richer, with governments now switching from innovative to conserv-
ative policies across tasks in equilibrium. In the yardstick competition equi-
libria, the force driving rent-seeking governments to perform the innovative
policy (given that it is optimal to do so) is the following: knowing that suc-
cessfully innovating benevolent governments in the neighborhood will reveal
the new policy being superior, rent-seeking governments are forced to use the
innovation in order to build up a reputation sufficiently strong to gain reelec-
tion. The paper has thus presented a theoretical example where competition
between independent governments improves the political system’s properties
with regard to the selection of optimal policies in a discrete choice problem.
In future empirical work on the behavior of jurisdictions in the adoption
of policy innovations, the hypotheses provided by the yardstick competition
model should be tested. An empirical literature on the question how jurisdic-
tions influence each other in the choice between ‘traditional’ and ‘new’ policies
is largely missing. This is somewhat surprising, given that Walker (1969) has
addressed the question already many years ago and that both researchers and
practitioners should be interested in learning more on competition between
jurisdictions with respect to the adoption of political best-practice technolo-
gies.
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Appendix
Proof of proposition 3:
We will be brief since the proof is similar to the one for proposition 2. We
start with the voter in i = 2. Let Pr[I2 = G|(p2A, v2A), (p2B, v2B); (p1A, v1A)]
denote his beliefs. Consider the following five cases on the equilibrium path:
(I) Pr[I2 = G|(n, pi + 2∆), (o, pi); (n, pi + 3∆)] = γθq(1−σ)γθq(1−σ)+(1−γ)(1−q(2−σ)) . This
is at least as high as γ given that θ ≥ θ˜. Since σ ≤ σ∗∗ we have θ˜ ≤ 1.
(II) Pr[I2 = G|(n, pi+2∆), (o, pi); (n, pi+2∆)] = γθσ+(1−γ)θ(1−σ)γθσ+(1−γ)(1−θ)(1−σ) . This is at
least as high as γ given that θ ≥ γ(1−σ)γσ+(1−γ)(1−σ) , which is implied by θ ≥ θ˜.
(III) Pr[I2 = G|(o, pi), (o, pi); (o, pi +∆)] = γθq(1−σ)γθq(1−σ)+(1−γ)(1−q(2−σ)) . See (I).
(IV) Pr[I2 = G|(o, pi), (o, pi); (o, pi)] = γ
2θ2qσ+γ(1−γ)θ2q(1−σ)
γ2θ2qσ+γ(1−γ)θ(1+θ)q(1−σ)+(1−γ)2(1−q(2−σ)) .
This is at least as high as γ if the denominator in γ˜ is smaller than or
equal to zero given that σ ≥ 1/(1 + θ), which is implied by σ ≥ σ˜. θ ≥ ˜˜θ
guarantees that for all q ∈ [0.5, 1] there exists some σ such that 1/(1 +
θ) ≤ σ ≤ σ∗∗ holds. If the denominator in γ˜ is strictly positive we have
Pr[I2 = G|(o, pi), (o, pi); (o, pi)] ≥ γ since γ ≥ γ˜. With σ ≥ 1/(1 + θ) it is
guaranteed that γ˜ ≤ 1.
(V) Pr[I2 = G|(o, pi), (o, pi); (o, pi − τ¯)] = γθ2σγθ2σ+(1−γ)(1−σ) . This is at least as
high as γ given that σ ≥ σ˜. θ ≥ ˜˜θ guarantees that for all q ∈ [0.5, 1] there
exists some σ ∈ [0.5, 1] such that σ˜ ≤ σ ≤ σ∗∗ holds.
In all remaining cases the optimality of the voting rule is immediately obvious
from Bayes’ Rule or given by the out-of-equilibrium beliefs. By repeating the
same procedure for the voter in i = 1 it is easy to show that the proposed
voting rule is optimal given that the conditions specified above hold. The
details are omitted.
For the incumbent in i = 1 the situation is basically unchanged compared to
the situation with an identical neighborhood jurisdiction. He must be willing
to invest e in order to gain reelection. Since δ ≥ δ∗∗ this is the case. The
incumbent in i = 2 must prefer the new policy for task A if sA = 1, S2 = H
and I1 = G. This requires δ ≥ 1− (∆− 12e)/τ˜ , which is implied by δ ≥ δ∗∗.
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